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Beer’s rich and rigorous attempt at dismantling old and deeply entrenched
prejudices in cognitive science through the painstaking analysis of an evolved
agent is more than welcome—especially so after a decade or more of
not-quite-delivered promises from the dynamical systems approach to
cognition. We are broadly in sympathy with the perspective Beer espouses,
but we want to invite the author to take one more step and join us in seeing
his work as leading to consequences that are even more radical than those
reached in his paper.
A central part of Beer’s paper is his rejection of representationalism; that
is, he rejects the idea that cognition consists of the manipulation of symbolic
internal representations. It is important to note that representationalism is
just one aspect of a bigger and older idea, namely internalism, the belief that
cognition is something that goes on inside the head. Our thesis in brief is that
Beer might as well go all the way and reject internalism in all its guises.
Beer seems to take for granted the following dilemma: either higher-level,
agent-based explanations (those that use concepts such as cognition,
knowledge, meaning, etc.) should be reducible to explanations in terms of
internal, representational mechanisms, or such higher level descriptions can be
dispensed with in favour of dynamical explanations of the coupled
brain-body-environment system. Clearly Beer makes a compelling case for the
1second of these two options: after close examination of the circle-catching,
diamond-avoiding agent, we ﬁnd no circle or diamond detectors and nothing
that resembles a representation of a circle or a diamond. Appeals to internal
representations are not needed to explain the agent’s behaviour, whereas the
right set of dynamical equations allows us to understand what is going on.
Beer’s work is an extended thought experiment with powerful
anti-representationalist consequences. Furthermore, Beer is absolutely right to
insist that any last-ditch attempt to extend the talk of representations so as to
encompass the environment can only lead to confusion. If there are
representations, these must be internal, no matter how intricate their causal
connection to features of the environment. (Circles and diamonds out there in
the world cannot sensibly be described as representing themselves.) It follows
then that representations cannot explain perception and action, because,
under Beer’s view, these are properties of the coupled agent/environment
system and not properties of the internal machinery of the agent.
So, we see that representationalism takes something of a battering at
Beer’s hands. This is all well and good, but we should ask ourselves why
representationalist views held any appeal in the ﬁrst place. The attraction of
the position comes about because it matches the Cartesian intuition that
thoughts, cognition, and knowledge are things located in the head. Putting it
another way, representations are theoretical devices to give ﬂesh to the
intuitive appeal of the idea that thought happens inside the agent—in its head,
soul, brain, or wherever. Intuitive internalism gives rise to representationalism
and not the other way around. Therefore representationalism is best dealt
with at its source: that is, by challenging the notion that thought is internal.
Returning to Beer’s argument: it seems that he believes that because he
has rejected representationalism, he is left with an eliminativist position with
respect to concepts like knowledge and meaning. In other words, there is no
2place for such concepts in cognitive science, and the only proper explanations
will be dynamical systems accounts of cognitive agents coupled with their
environments. However, this would only follow if the representationalist
perspective was the only way to make sense of knowledge and meaning. We
would like to oﬀer an externalist perspective on these concepts which does
away with representationalism without disposing of all agent-level talk. (By
“externalist” we mean simply the opposite of internalism; an acceptance of the
idea that cognition is spread out across the agent and the world.) The
dilemma identiﬁed by Beer is a false one, and it is possible to save the baby of
agent-level explanation while throwing out the representational bathwater.
Cognitive science does not need to give up on talking about agent-level
concepts such as knowledge and meaning: we just need to recognize that
knowledge and meaning, as much as perception and action, are features of the
coupled system and not something internal.
Why do we feel that agent-level description is worth saving? Why are we
convinced that the impressive analytic tools of dynamical systems theory are
not the only tools needed by the cognitive scientist? We refer the reader to the
deceptively obvious fact that Beer needs to describe his agent as a circle
catcher and a diamond avoider. Indeed, these are the propensities that his
agent was selected for over many generations of evolution. This description is
admittedly simple, but it is agent-level talk, and clearly of a diﬀerent
explanatory level than a description of the agent/environment system in terms
of diﬀerential equations. As a quick thought experiment of our own, we ask
whether anyone could possibly make sense of the behaviour of the agent given
only the dynamical systems description so carefully developed in the paper,
and not the brief but enormously helpful agent-level description. Looking only
at the lower level, it would be extremely diﬃcult and perhaps impossible to
see that all of this complexity was in the service of circle catching and
3diamond avoidance.
A parallel observation applies also to the work described in
Nepomnyashchikh and Podgornyj’s paper. They observe surprisingly fruitful
behaviour from systems of coupled oscillators that have received only minimal
design eﬀort. However, the behavioural output can only be made sense of in
the light of agent-level descriptions such as wandering, searching, and
sampling. If systems as simple as those constructed by Beer and by
Nepomnyashchikh and Podgornyj require on the one hand agent-level
explanations and on the other hand lower-level description in terms of
dynamical systems, then clearly cognitive science’s more ambitious targets
such as human beings and other animals will also require both levels of
description.
Thus Beer should not be concerned that endorsing an agent-level
description will commit him to the follies of old-fashioned representational
cognitive science. One can say that the agent catches circles and avoids
diamonds without conceiving of cognition as a series of rule-governed
operations over internal symbols. We encourage Beer to go all the way with
the externalism he exhibits in his analyses of perception and decision-making.
On the view we are urging, mind is not internal, it is all over the place; indeed,
“mind” is just a very abstract way of describing the agent/environment
interaction. The debate over representationalism loses all urgency once the
image of the mind as a place of internal knowings has been dispelled.
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